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1 Flying a kite can involve the degree and kind of skill that often elevates an activity into an art; and whether or not one is highly skilled in kite-fl ying, fl ying a kite can still be pleasurable-even for an unskilled child. But do the Banks children have an aesthetic experience when they fl y their kite, or is it merely a pleasurable experience? It has always seemed to me that any sensitive person, who values art, will insist that a philosophical account of the art of kite-fl ying is only satisfactory when it accounts for the special value that the experience of art-the aesthetic experience of art-has in our lives. And so I a ach especial importance to revisiting the problem of aesthetic experience. I propose an analysis of aesthetic experience that draws on a concept that has historically been closely associated with art and aesthetics: pleasure. Aesthetic experience is pleasurable experience, but it is more than that: it is experience that transforms our capacity for pleasure. I argue as follows:
1. Despite a rich historical tradition concerning the subject, we lack a philosophically sound conception of aesthetic experience;
2. Experiencing pleasure is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience, but not a su cient condition for aesthetic experience;
3. Some aesthetic experiences involve an unpleasant aspect in addition to being pleasurable, and this has been taken to be paradoxical;
4. Some experiences of painting involve a transformation of our capacity for pleasure;
5. There is a variety of ways in which the capacity for pleasure can be transformed (and such a transformation might involve an unpleasant aspect);
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7. Aesthetic experiences o er an opportunity for moral growth through the transformation of our capacity to take pleasure in new ways.
In a long tradition of a empting to characterize what distinguishes "aesthetic" experiences from "non-aesthetic," "ordinary," or "practical" experiences, much labor has been expended in a empts to link the di erence between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences with a distinction between objective and subjective experiences. 2 Presented with a kitchen scene of fruit, vegetables, fi sh, and game carefully arranged in a casual-albeit appealing-way, I might take pleasure in the tasty array before me, on account of the delight that I take in thinking about eating these things. However, I might also take pleasure in the very way in which the objects have been arranged: their colors and shadows, contrasting forms and textures, and the relationship between the shapes of the components and the whole arrangement. To understand aesthetic and nonaesthetic experience in terms of disinterested and interested a ention would be to deem the fi rst experience non-aesthetic, and the second experience aesthetic. When I take pleasure in the tastiness of the objects, my a ention is interested: I take pleasure in the value that the objects have for me. When I take pleasure in the formal properties of the objects, my a ention is disinterested: I take pleasure in the value that the objects have in themselves, independently of their use for me. Both experiences of the still life are pleasurable; however the disinterested experience of the still life is aesthetic, whereas the interested experience is non-aesthetic.
Disinterestedness is not the only way of characterizing how aesthetic experience di ers from ordinary experience. Returning to the kitchen still life, appealing though the visual impression is, the olfactory sensation is anything but appealing. The kitchen is heavy with the o ending smell of stale cooking fat. It might seem that the only way to have an aesthetic experience of the kitchen scene is to eliminate both the o ending smell and the appeal of the tasty-looking foodstu s. But disgusting though the olfactory sensation is, it lends the air a heaviness that intensifi es the visual impression of the still life. On one analysis, if the subject can change how he experiences the disgusting smell by pu ing it "out of gear"; if he can insert "psychical distance" between himself and his disgust in the stale smell, although it is still foul, he might fi nd there is something strangely appealing about the mingling of pleasing visual sensation and the heaviness of the o ending olfactory sensation. On such an analysis, an aesthetic experience is not an experience in which the subject eliminates his personal interest from the experience, but one in which he puts his personal concerns "out of gear," by inserting "psychical distance" between himself and his personal interest. 3 However, both of these a empts at distinguishing aesthetic experiences from other experiences have proven unsatisfactory. It seems that rather than identifying aesthetic and non-aesthetic ways in which the subject might experience the object, the theories draw a distinction between a ention and ina ention to the object (rather than distanced and over/under-distanced a ention); or interested and disinterested motivations for a ending to an object in the same way (rather than interested and disinterested a ention to the object).
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An alternative approach would have us not distinguish aesthetic experience from ordinary experience, but explain the sense in which aesthetic experiences are perfected instances of ordinary experiences: aesthetic and nonaesthetic experiences are of the same kind, but aesthetic experiences are more "complete," or more "unifi ed" experiences of this kind. 5 Imagine that a meal has been cooked in our kitchen for a dinner in an Edwardian country house. Upstairs, an appropriate selection of salon music is played discreetly; pre-dinner drinks are served; there is a pa er of light conversation and anticipation for what the evening holds when the butler sounds the gong and the gentlemen escort the ladies in to table; there is a feeling of solemnity as grace is recited; a succession of succulent courses are served with complementary wines; the dinner guests feel increasingly jolly as they drink and develop a rapport with their dining companions; they feel sated after the meal. There is a succession of phenomenally objective features of the evening (the tastes, sounds, sights, and so forth) and phenomenally subjective features of the evening (the feeling of anticipation, jollity, satiation, and so forth). And all these features are presented in an order that lends a sense of unity or completeness to the evening: the taste sensations come in the right order, the music is appropriate at each point, the banter, and so forth. And we might compare this with what is happening downstairs: there is shouting, there are dirty pots and pans, smells from the di erent courses intermingling: it is not just that all of this is less pleasant than what is happening upstairs, but that there is no structure to the sequence of events that forms the experience of the downstairs servants' evening that lends this experience a sense of unity or completeness. The structure of the sequence of events forming the guests' experience of the evening has a unity or completeness and hence they might have something approaching an aesthetic experience, whereas the sequence of the servants' experience lacks such structure and is anything but aesthetic. Again, objections are raised against such characterizations of aesthetic experience, notably that it is far from clear what it would mean for some experiences of objects to be more "complete" or "unifi ed" than other experiences of the same objects, in the way that we more readily understand the objects themselves as being more or less complete or unifi ed. 6 In these circumstances, we might draw one of three conclusions: that there simply is no such thing as an aesthetic experience; 7 that there are aesthetic experiences, but they are ine able and their necessary and su cient conditions defy characterization; 8 or that aesthetic experience is a kind of "cluster-concept" for which we should seek fl exible criteria rather than necessary and su cient conditions. 9 Indeed, all three conclusions are consistent with the trend in the twentieth century that shifts a ention away from aesthetic experiences of subjects towards aesthetic properties of objects, and a renewed interest in taste.
10 My suggestion, however, is that we ought not to abandon aesthetic experience. Rather, we should try to understand what is valuable about the special way in which aesthetic experience transforms our capacity for pleasure. of their value, there are other experiences which we fi nd pleasurable, but which we do not regard as aesthetic. The experience of a winning hand in poker, or the experience of lying down in one's own bed after returning from an arduous-but successful-journey, is pleasurable without being aesthetic. The challenge for an account of aesthetic experience as pleasurable experience is to explain why some pleasurable experiences are aesthetic whilst others are not. Typical cases of pleasurable experiences that are aesthetic are our experiences of works of art. The conceptual relationship between art and the aesthetic is an uncertain one, and the problem of which has conceptual priority is of direct relevance to any a empt to characterize either. 11 Intuitively, it is as natural to associate art with pleasure as it is to associate aesthetic experience with pleasure. 12 That art is a source of pleasure is central to the Abbe Ba eux's seminal account of the arts. 13 It has been argued that Ba eux's is the fi rst a empt, in the Western tradition, to provide a defi nition of the fi ne arts as a system. 14 In doing so, Ba eux builds on a tradition that has long associated art with imitation, and imitation with pleasure. 15 For Ba eux, all arts are concerned with the "imitation of beautiful nature." What separates out the fi ne arts-music, sculpture, painting, poetry and the dance-from the other mechanical arts is that the fi ne arts all have pleasure as their end. 16 The centrality of pleasure to the fi ne arts persists in the modern defi nition of art. 17 Such an account seeks to explain art as that which is made to provoke, and which succeeds in provoking, some kind of noninstrumentally valuable experience (an experience that comes to be called the "aesthetic experience").
II
An objection to Ba eux's defi nition of art in terms of pleasure might contend that there are things other than art that give us pleasure. The reply could be made, however, that such things are not imitations: art (or in Ba eux's terminology, fi ne art) is not just an object that is the source of pleasure, but an imitation that gives pleasure. Even so, is the pleasure derived from imitation di erent from the pleasure derived from non-imitative sources of pleasure? This concern need not be a problem for a theory of fi ne art in terms of pleasure and imitation, but it is a problem for a theory that defi nes aesthetic experience in terms of pleasure alone.
If aesthetic experience of art is a pleasurable experience similar to aesthetic experience of nature, but di erent from pleasurable non-aesthetic experience of art and nature, there must be something about the pleasure of aesthetic experience that is common to all aesthetic experiences, but di erent from other non-aesthetic pleasures.
18 However, the situation is further complicated because, although there would have to be something in common between the pleasure of the aesthetic experience of art and nature, it would be a mistake to think that there are no signifi cant di erences between the aesthetic experience of art and the aesthetic experience of nature. 19 A satisfactory account of aesthetic experience needs to accommodate the di erences between the aesthetic appreciation of art and nature, whilst still providing the necessary and su cient conditions common to aesthetic experience of either kind of object.
Pleasure is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience. (That is, pleasure, as distinct from pleasure derived from imitation.) Our experience and intuitions present di culties for imagining an aesthetic experience that is not
Damien Freeman 60 pleasurable. We would say that a subject who fails to experience pleasure, when engaging with a work of art, fails to have an aesthetic experience of the work of art, even if the subject had the experience prescribed by the artist. Furthermore, to assert that pleasure is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience is not to say that every work of art o ers an aesthetic experience; only that the aesthetic experience of art is pleasurable (even when it is also unpleasurable in some sense). The experience of art might be pleasurable in some sense without being aesthetic.
So it seems that pleasure is not a su cient condition for aesthetic experience, even if it is a necessary condition. After a brief digression in the next section, I shall argue in the following two sections that there is a special sense in which our experience of pleasure in some experiences is not merely necessary for their counting as aesthetic experiences, but su cient for it. III A , element of "unpleasure." 20 Notable among these are aesthetic experiences of the tragic, the sublime, and the horrifi c. The unpleasure of aesthetic experience varies: the tragic distresses us, the sublime overwhelms us, and the horrifi c disgusts us. But in each case, at least since the eighteenth century, it has seemed paradoxical to theorists that we should seek out and enjoy aesthetic experiences which are distressing, overwhelming, or disgusting experiences, when we ordinarily avoid distressing, overwhelming, and disgusting experiences.
In Greek tragedy, the audience experiences the distressing emotions of fear and pity in response to the hero's su ering, and yet they seem to take pleasure in this experience. 21 Why should they take pleasure in the fear and pity when normally these are emotions from which they would shy away? Aristotle accounts for the pleasure that the audience takes in their experience of fear and pity in terms of . 22 Although fear and pity are unpleasant emotions, the of the same emotions is said to be pleasurable. Precisely what Aristotle means by remains uncertain, and this has given rise to much scholarly debate. 23 However, even if scholars could reach agreement about the meaning of Aristotle's term, this ancient account of tragedy still leaves us asking, What sort of creatures must we be for the peculiar combination of delight and distress characteristic of our experience of tragedy to be possible?
By the eighteenth century, it was this psychological problem that interested theorists rather than the technical problems faced by the ancient tragic poet. 24 Aristotle's account seems to suggest that our experience of tragedy is paradoxical, and that it assumes a paradoxical streak in our psychology that is unsavory to the enlightenment mind. Hume's solution is relatively simple. Whereas Aristotle's account has incompatible distressing states (fear and pity) and delight ( ) co-existing in the audience, Hume argues that, in tragedy, the distress is converted into the delight. 25 In this way, he can account for the delight of tragedy being commensurate with the distress of tragedy, and can achieve this without the paradox of the co-existence of seemingly incompatible emotional states.
The move from to conversion overcomes the theoretical problem of taking delight in being distressed, but it does so at the cost of introducing the obscure concept of conversion. The obscurity aside, this still seems to be an unsatisfactory analysis because it suggests that, ultimately, the experience ceases to be distressing and becomes delightful, whereas it was meant to be an account of an experience that is simultaneously distressing and delightful. One way around this objection is to distinguish a direct response to the tragic su ering from a meta-response to the direct response: our direct response to the su ering is distressing; but our meta-response to the distressing direct response is one of delight. 26 Why should we delight in our having a distressing response? Two reasons are suggested: fi rst, I take pleasure in my awareness that I have the appropriate moral response to the su ering of others; and, secondly, that we all share this response a rms our common humanity as a community of moral agents, and this awareness is also a source of pleasure. The analysis of the distress and delight of tragedy in terms of a direct response and meta-response meets with further objections. 27 However, the concept of the meta-response is at least clearer than or conversion, and so I shall treat it as the preferred analysis of the relationship between pleasure and distress in aesthetic experience.
The eighteenth century saw not only a resurgence of scholarly interest in antiquity's tragedy, but also in its theories of the sublime. 28 The sublime is an experience related to awe. God is both to be feared for His omnipotence and revered for His omni-benevolence, and the appropriate emotion to feel about God is a shot emotion that is pleasurable (reverence for His love) but also tinged with unpleasure (fear of His power). This a itude came to be transferred from the Creator to the most monumental of His creations. Looking at the starry heavens above and the tallest mountains beyond, or witnessing the fi ercest hurricanes and storms at sea from a distance, we experience something that is pleasurable, but also uncomfortable. There is something overwhelming about such experiences which is a source of both pleasure and unpleasure, and an analysis is required of this peculiar experience.
29
The study of the sublime found in Kant's third Critique combines the eighteenth century's two prevalent traditions of the sublime as self-transcendence and the sublime as enthusiastic terror. 30 Kant distinguishes two forms of the sublime. 31 In each case, the experience is threefold: I perceive some natural phenomenon whose size is too great for me to estimate, or whose force is so great that it is far beyond my own; I feel overwhelmed by my own insignifi cance compared with nature; but, I remember that despite being overwhelmed, the moral law within me makes me superior to the natural phenomenon, and this is a pleasant thought. Thus the experience is both overwhelming and comforting and gives rise to a peculiar fused emotion that is both pleasurable and unpleasurable. There is much about which to be critical at each stage of this account. 32 However, for present purposes, what ma ers is the aim of the account, rather than its success or failure. It identifi es a special kind of experience that is pleasurable. What makes this a distinctive kind of pleasurable experience is the unpleasurable element that is involved, the feeling of being overwhelmed by the object. And the relationship between the pleasure and the unpleasure is analyzed in terms of a fused emotion which is both pleasurable and unpleasurable rather than in terms of conversion or meta-response as in the case of tragedy.
The eighteenth century's paradox of tragedy fi nds a parallel in the
Damien Freeman 62 twentieth century's paradox of horror. As with tragedy, horror o ers us an experience in which we derive both pleasure and unpleasure. However, whereas we fi nd tragedy distressing, horror is disgusting. Horror does not involve the ethically serious of tragedy. It is the pleasure that we might take in gratuitous gore, violence, and otherwise disgusting imagery that cinematic techniques achieve most e ectively in the genre of the horror fi lm. It is not just that the nature of the unpleasurable element is di erent in tragedy and horror. There is reason to think that relationship between the disgust and the pleasure of horror requires a di erent analysis from that required by the relationship between the distress and the pleasure of tragedy. Such an analysis is developed by Noel Carroll. 33 Carroll argues that horror audiences take pleasure in the form of the work of art, despite being disgusted by the content. But there is a special relationship between the form and content: the disgusting content is a necessary condition for experiencing the pleasure of the form. 34 The locus of pleasure is the narrative structure; the locus of unpleasure is the disgusting monster with which the narrative is concerned. So the locus of pleasure is distinct from the locus of unpleasure, although the unpleasant content is a necessary condition for experiencing the pleasure in the form: it is only because of our reaction to the disgusting monster that we become interested in the narrative structure in which we take pleasure. Such an analysis depends upon there being discrete loci of pleasure and unpleasure in horror, a claim that has been challenged. 35 If the analysis is correct, however, it suggests a further way in which pleasure and unpleasure might be related in an aesthetic experience. To the extent that one accepts Carroll's analysis, it seems that the solution to the paradox of horror is distinct from the paradox of tragedy.
Whereas the scholarship on tragedy is concerned with three di erent ways of analyzing how an aesthetic experience can involve both pleasure and distress, we can also compare the analysis of these distressing aesthetic experiences with potential analyses of overwhelming and disgusting aesthetic experiences. The correct analysis of how distress a ends the pleasure of tragedy (be it , conversion, or meta-response) may well di er from the correct analysis of how disgust or being overwhelmed a ends the pleasure of horror or the sublime (possibly a dual-aspect emotion in the sublime and responses to discrete loci, one response being a condition precedent for the other, in horror). The foregoing discussion is not intended to be conclusive as regards the discrete paradoxes. But it is enough to enable us to establish that di erent aesthetic experiences might demand di erent analyses because they involve di erent kinds of unpleasure. As there are di erent ways in which unpleasure can a end the pleasure of an aesthetic experience, what presently concerns us is not the paradox of aesthetic experience being at once pleasurable and unpleasurable, but the di erent ways in which the experience's unpleasure can be related to its pleasure. This prepares us for the claim that there might be a range of ways in which unpleasure can transform the capacity for pleasure.
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T H R P to be able to say something about the sense in which the pleasure of aesthetic experience is di erent from the pleasure of non-aesthetic experiences. In advancing such a claim, I shall make use of an idea found in Richard Wollheim's philosophy of painting: the possibility that some experiences involve a transformation of the capacity for taking pleasure.
36
In Painting as an Art, Wollheim provides an account of what it means to paint as an artist. In order to understand what the artist does, Wollheim claims that we must understand what the spectator sees: the artist exploits his awareness of the spectator's visual capacities as he marks his canvas, and he is able to do this because he assumes dual roles as artist and spectator throughout the painting process. Wollheim identifi es three visual capacities: seeing-in, our capacity for perceiving three-dimensional space in a two-dimensional plane; 37 expressive perception, our capacity for perceiving emotion in a painted surface; 38 and visual delight, our capacity to take pleasure in our visual experience. 39 It is in the account of visual delight that Wollheim discusses the transformation of our capacity for pleasure, which I shall develop in this essay.
Wollheim draws our a ention to Proust's account of the pleasure we take in the subject-ma er of Chardin's paintings and Vasari's account of our experience of the loose brushwork in Titian's later paintings. 40 In both cases, Wollheim wants to claim that there is something special about the pleasure that we take in these pictures; something which is lacking in pleasurable experiences that do not involve visual delight.
One way of understanding such a claim would be to assert that there are di erent kinds of pleasure and that the pleasure of visual delight is somehow di erent from that of other pleasures. Such a distinction has been used in utilitarian ethics in an a empt to explain why some pleasures are more valuable than others, but the idea that we can readily distinguish qualitatively di erent kinds of pleasure has met with strong criticism. 41 In claiming that the visual experience of paintings transforms our experience of pleasure, Wollheim does not assert that the phenomenology of the experience of pleasure changes. He wants to suggest that what is happening in Proust's experience of Chardin and Vasari's experience of Titian "does not mutilate [pleasure], or etherealize it. It retains, in other words, its sensuous, its sensual, character." 42 What then does painting as an art do to pleasure? "It transforms our capacity to experience pleasure." 43 It is the capacity for taking pleasure that is transformed, rather than the experience of pleasure itself. I shall consider fi rst the sense in which Wollheim believes that Proust's experience of Chardin transforms our capacity for pleasure and then the sense in which Wollheim thinks that we can identify a related phenomenon in Vasari's experience of Titian.
Proust is concerned with the pleasure that we take in the subject-ma er of Chardin's paintings. 44 I can enter a kitchen any number of times, look around, and not seem to take any particular pleasure in it. But then I might look at a picture of a kitchen by Chardin, and fi nd myself taking pleasure in the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of its subject-ma er. But more than that, Proust says that I might fi nd that the picture is intimate, domestic, and lively like a kitchen. Yet, in my previous experience of kitchens, I never seemed to take any particular pleasure in their intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness. On Wollheim's reading, Proust claims that T H R P vol.XVII 2010
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Chardin's paintings have the ability to transform our capacity to take pleasure in intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness. I can take pleasure in the painting's intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness because Chardin took pleasure in painting his subject. He took pleasure in painting the kitchen because he took pleasure in the kitchen's intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness. However, neither Chardin nor I was conscious of the pleasure that we took in the kitchen's intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness. It is only when we engage with Chardin's representation that we become conscious of our previously unconscious pleasure. When we engage with Chardin's representation of his subject-ma er, our capacity for taking pleasure in the subject-ma er is transformed: although we always found the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of kitchens pleasurable, we were not aware of this until our experience of the representation transformed our capacity for taking pleasure in it by rousing our awareness of previously unconscious feelings.
There is a second way in which the experience of Chardin's painting transforms our capacity for pleasure. Not only does his treatment of the subject-ma er enable us to become conscious of the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of his subject-ma er, but his treatment of this subject-ma er gives us a representation that we also fi nd singular, grand, and beautiful. After experiencing this representation of a kitchen, when we subsequently return to an actual kitchen, we not only fi nd that we are now conscious of the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of the kitchen in which we take pleasure, but also that the kitchen is singular, grand, and beautiful like a Chardin, just as we previously found the Chardin intimate, domestic, and alive like a kitchen. Now we can take pleasure in the Chardin-like singularity, grandeur, and beauty that we fi nd in the kitchen. This is the second sense in which Chardin's painting transforms our capacity for taking pleasure.
Wollheim maintains that in addition to taking pleasure in the subjectma er of a painting, and having our capacity for pleasure transformed by our experience of the painting's subject-ma er, we can also take pleasure in the sensuous quality of the matière, the painted surface itself. He writes:
Important loci in the tradition of art criticism are those passages where the critic's admiration for the representational skill of the artist he is considering takes the form of pointing out how what at one moment seems an image at the next moment dissolves into a paint surface without meaning. I am thinking of Vasari on Titian, Reynolds on Gainsborough, Zola on Manet's Olympia. These passages . . . can be taken as tributes to the power these pictures have to evoke visual delight -as well as o ering a hypothesis about where the visual delight in matière is generated. It lies in the perception of what is apprehended as detail: detail relative to a more comprehensive, a more distanced, view of the marked surface. 45 The idea here seems to be that, although we might enjoy looking at any representation, there is something more that happens when we a end to certain pictures. The brushwork that the artist uses to execute the painting catches our a ention. But it is not merely that we can a end to the brushwork, and take pleasure in that; or a end to the scene being depicted, and take pleasure in that. Rather, our experience of the brushwork can transform how we take pleasure in the picture. There is a new pleasure that is derived from moving between the brushwork and the scene being represented, and taking pleasure in the brushwork
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as a detail of the over all image. This e ect is what Vasari describes as the painting seeming 'alive' in his discussion of Titian's pictures of Prometheus, Sisyphus, Tityus, Venus and Adonis, Perseus and Andromeda, and Diana:
It is true that Titian's manner in these works is very di erent from his youthful style. His early work is careful and delicate and may be seen at a distance or examined closely. His later work is done in bold strokes and dashes and, if seen too near, the e ect is confusing, but at a distance it is perfect. This manner has been widely imitated and is responsible for many wretched pictures. His imitators evidently labor under the delusion that it is easy to paint loosely. Actually, Titian's great expense of time and labor is most obvious. This method of his is a judicious, admirable, and beautiful one which makes the paintings seem alive and is done with a profound art, which is nevertheless concealed. do not "seem alive." I suggest that the reason for this is that our experience of the matière does not transform the pleasure we take in these pictures. We do not fi nd that there is a pleasure to be taken in the brushwork as details of the complete picture as we do when we look at Titian's pictures. V A W experience of art transforms the subject's capacity to take pleasure in the work of art, it is also possible to show that some aspect of the experience of nature can transform the subject's capacity to take pleasure in the natural object. For this, I turn to the writing of Ronald Hepburn, whose work on the distinctiveness of our experience of natural beauty demonstrates the sense in which our aesthetic experience of nature di ers from the experience of art. 47 One distinction concerns the sense in which we participate in nature whereas we are detached from works of art. The experience of feeling part of something is markedly di erent from the feeling of confronting it. Of our experience of being part of nature, Hepburn writes:
On occasion, [a spectator] may confront natural objects as a static, disengaged observer; but far more typically the objects envelop him on all sides. In a forest, trees surround him; he is ringed by hills, or he stands in the midst of a plain. If there is movement in the scene, the spectator may himself be in motion, and his motion may be an important element in his aesthetic experience. Think, for instance, of a glider-pilot, delighting in a sense of buoyancy, in the balancing of the air-currents that hold him aloft. 48 And on the e ect that this has on the subject, he quotes Barbara Hepworth's remark:
What a di erent shape and "being" one becomes lying on the sand with the sea almost above from when standing against the wind on a sheer high cli with seabirds circling pa erns below one. 49 This involvement of the subject in the object-or more properly, in the environment-which he is experiencing, is central to our experience of nature T H R P vol.XVII 2010 as opposed to art: "we are in nature and part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over against a painting on the wall." 50 I would submit that one way in which we might understand Hepburn's insight is to say that our capacity for participating in the natural environment around us can transform our capacity to take pleasure in that environment. Thus, the distinctiveness of how we experience nature (as opposed to art) can serve as a distinctive way in which our capacity for taking pleasure can be transformed.
Whilst Hepburn is at pains to emphasize the ways in which the aesthetic experience of nature di ers from the aesthetic experience of art, he is also interested in the ways in which we can experience nature in the light of art. Again, he identifi es a number of ways in which this might occur, but the most compelling case comes from our experience of impressionist painting. It is a commonplace to say that painters teach us how to look, and, in particular, that the impressionists have taught us to see light. 51 But they can change how we see nature. A lifetime of looking at Pissarro landscapes might have the e ect of enabling us to see daubs of paint as foliage on a tree; but more than that, Hepburn suggests that it might also have the e ect (what Hepburn calls the "over-e ect") of enabling us to see the foliage on a tree as daubs of paint. 52 The experience of nature in the light of Pissarro is more than just a ma er of discovering that we can see the Pissaro-like quality of foliage. It is a ma er of taking pleasure in this. When we a end to a tree with our experience of Pissarro's paintings in mind, it is not merely that our awareness that foliage can resemble daubs of paint is a component of the experience, whereas before we had looked at Pissarro's pictures it is not a component of the experience. This awareness is an aspect of the experience which transforms our capacity to take pleasure in the tree. Surely, it is the pleasure that really ma ers to Hepburn in his experience of nature in the light of art; his ability to take pleasure in looking at a tree in a way that he was not previously able to take pleasure in it. Hence we should understand his insight as yet another instance of the way in which an aspect of our experience can transform our capacity for pleasure.
The discussion of Wollheim and Hepburn has not involved any claims about whether the experience of pleasure is the same in each of these natural and artistic examples. What I have tried to show is that each experience can be analyzed as involving a transformation in the subject's capacity for taking pleasure. Furthermore, the examples illustrate di erent ways in which experience can transform our capacity for pleasure. In the experiences of Proust and Vasari, it is some feature of the visual experience of the painted surface-its representational or sensuous properties-that transforms the capacity for pleasure. In Hepburn's experiences, it is the subject's participation in the object, or his awareness of art history, that transforms the capacity for pleasure. Returning to the experiences discussed in §3, I would now suggest that a di erent aspect of each of those experiences also transforms the capacity for pleasure.
Whether or not we accept any of the previous analyses of tragedy, the sublime, or horror, each of the experiences submi ed to analysis involves an element of unpleasure as well as pleasure. In each case, we might understand the analysis as a empting to o er an account of how the unpleasure transforms the capacity for pleasure in those experiences. In experiences of tragedy, distress transforms our capacity for taking pleasure (and this might be analyzed in terms of , conversion, or a direct response and meta-response). In experiences of the sublime, the feeling of being overwhelmed transforms our capacity for taking pleasure (and this might be analyzed in terms of a fused emotion). In experiences of horror, disgust transforms our capacity for taking pleasure (and this might be analyzed in terms of discrete loci). Thus, although Wollheim introduces the idea of a transformation of pleasure in order to explain the special experience of visual delight that we take in the painted surface, we see that the idea can be developed in order to explain how distress, disgust, and being overwhelmed can transform our capacity for taking pleasure. This suggests that there might be a whole range of ways in which our capacity for taking pleasure can be transformed by some aspect of a pleasurable experience.
In the next section, I shall argue that the transformation of the capacity for pleasure is what characterizes an experience as aesthetic rather than as merely pleasurable. In doing so, I shall rely heavily on what I have said about experiences in which the capacity for pleasure is transformed. But you might object to this formulation. Why not just say that these are experiences in which we discover a source of pleasure, and then take pleasure in the new object in the way that we have always taken pleasure in other objects? What is the di erence between "discovering a new pleasure" and "transforming the existing capacity to experience pleasure"? If my formulation is just a fancy way of saying that in some experiences we discover that an experience of an object can be pleasurable, it looks like this will not distinguish what is special about aesthetic experience as a distinctive way of experiencing an object. Three replies might be made to this objection.
First, there is a di erence between fi nding a new object of pleasure and fi nding a new way of taking pleasure in an object. It is possible that, the fi rst time I looked at a Kandinsky, I could not take much pleasure in it. Only later did I discover the pleasure of looking at abstract painting; that it is rewarding to look at a non-representational painting in a particular way. Having enjoyed looking at Kandinsky's pictures in this way, I then discovered a Miró, in which I found I could also take pleasure in the same way. When I fi rst discovered how to look at a Kandinsky, I found a new way of taking pleasure in a painting. When I discovered my fi rst Miró, I found a new object in which I could take pleasure in an old way. Transformation of pleasure is a ma er of fi nding new ways to take pleasure, not new objects of existing pleasures: it is more akin to the Kandinsky example than the Miró example.
Secondly, the transformation of pleasure is more than a cognitive discovery. It is not merely the discovery that there is another way of taking pleasure in an object, but actually experiencing the object in a new way. (The cognitive discovery that the object can be experienced in a new way might well be a consequence of experiencing it in this way.) The transformation of the capacity for pleasure is a ma er of how the subject takes pleasure, not what the subject discovers about how he might take pleasure. It is one thing for Picasso to discover that he can engage with an African mask in a particular way; it is another thing for him to engage with it in that way. The transformation of pleasure is a way of experiencing an object. It is analogous to the experience Picasso has when he T H R P vol.XVII 2010 engages with the mask in the same way that he engages with European art, rather than being like the cognitive discovery that the mask has certain experiential possibilities for him. Thirdly, the transformation occurs when one capacity of the subject transforms another capacity (that is, the capacity to take pleasure): the subject's capacity for visual perception, his capacity for memory and association, his capacity to be distressed, disgusted, overwhelmed, his capacity for participating in an environment, his capacity for appreciating art history, and so forth. In each case, the subject's capacity to take pleasure in the object changes, and it changes through the interaction between the subject's capacity for pleasure and the other relevant capacity. It is the interaction between of one of these capacities and the capacity for pleasure in Aristotle's experience of Oedipus Rex, in Kant's experience of the starry heavens above, and in Wollheim's experience of Chardin, that transforms their capacity to take pleasure in the experience rather than merely taking pleasure in the experience.
This much prepares our reply to a further objection. Even if you accept the idea that some experiences transform our capacity for pleasure, you might still argue that this only explains the signifi cance of the fi rst experience of a particular kind, and not of successive experiences of the same kind. Suppose that the fi rst time Proust looks at a Chardin his capacity to take pleasure is transformed such that he can take pleasure in the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of a kitchen scene. But once this transformation is e ected, what is special about his subsequent experiences of looking at Chardins? They cannot have any transformative value, because he has already acquired the capacity to take pleasure in the intimacy, domesticity, and liveliness of the kitchen.
To make such an objection, however, is to a end to a discovery about pleasure rather than a transformation of the capacity for pleasure. A cognitive discovery can only be made once (unless the agent forgets about it, and then "rediscovers" it). But the subject can continue to experience the object in the new way by ensuring that, in subsequent experiences, the capacity for pleasure interacts with the subject's other "transforming" capacity. VI I pleasure. Our intuitions suggest that plenty of pleasurable experiences ought not to be characterized as aesthetic experiences. This much tells us that experiencing pleasure, although perhaps necessary for aesthetic experience, is not su cient for it. However, the previous section has demonstrated that sometimes we can say more about an experience than simply that it is a pleasurable experience: sometimes we can say that an experience transforms our capacity for taking pleasure. If one accepts the foregoing analysis, then we can distinguish between experiences that are simply pleasurable and experiences that are not just pleasurable, but which also involve a transformation of our capacity for pleasure. Now we have the basis for a characterization of aesthetic experience in terms of pleasure: aesthetic experiences are those experiences which are not merely pleasurable, but which transform our capacity for pleasure. Non-aesthetic experiences may be pleasurable, but they do not transform our capacity for pleasure.
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The claim that an aesthetic experience is an experience that transforms our capacity for pleasure is compatible with the claim that there are pleasurable experiences which are not transformative. It is also compatible with the claim that there are transformative experiences which are not pleasurable. When King Lear goes mad in the storm scene and then recovers, he has a transformative experience, albeit one that is not pleasurable: the transformation concerns some capacity other than the capacity for taking pleasure. The experience of being mad in the storm is not an aesthetic experience. When the audience watches the storm scene in a performance of King Lear, however, they might take pleasure in this, and their capacity for pleasure might be transformed by some aspect of their experience of watching the play, in which case they will have an aesthetic experience of it. Transformative experiences are only aesthetic when it is the capacity for taking pleasure that is transformed by the experience.
We have seen that di erent constituents of an experience might transform the capacity for pleasure. These constituents might, however, be present in a pleasurable experience without transforming our capacity for pleasure. In such cases, the experience has two discrete components: we might take pleasure in the subject-ma er of a painting and a end to the matière without our awareness of the painted surface transforming our capacity for pleasure (for example, pictures by Titian's imitators). Similarly, we might watch a tragedy and take pleasure in the form of the drama and be distressed by the content of the drama without our unpleasure transforming our capacity for taking pleasure in the form. Thus, we can distinguish trivial (non-aesthetic) composite experiences from (aesthetic) transformative experiences in which one aspect of the experience transforms another aspect-our capacity for taking pleasure. That a potentially transformative component might be present in a pleasurable experience without transforming our capacity for pleasure is now understood as another way of saying that an experience can be pleasurable without being aesthetic.
It remains to consider whether this theory of aesthetic experience o ers a principled basis for resolving the di cult cases. Do experiences involving the applied and decorative arts, the appetites for food and sex, interactions in ordinary life, and engagements with failed fi ne art ever count as aesthetic experiences? It might seem to count as a weakness of a theory of aesthetic experience if it cannot tell us which, if any, of these uncertain cases are aesthetic experiences. However, such an approach is misguided. Our intuitions are ambivalent about the aesthetic status of such experiences. A theory of aesthetic experience should not be expected to dispel such ambivalence, but rather to account for it. And the proposed theory does this. All of these di cult cases are pleasurable in some sense. This much they have in common with aesthetic experiences. But they may not transform our capacity for pleasure in the way that aesthetic experiences do. In each case, we must determine whether some aspect of the pleasurable experience transforms our capacity for taking pleasure.
That aesthetic experiences are experiences that transform our capacity for pleasure explains why we sometimes have difficulty in distinguishing aesthetic experience from merely pleasurable experience. The Kama Sutra lays claim to providing advice that elevates sexual intercourse into an art. One way of understanding such a claim might be to say that it enables its practitioners to T H R P vol.XVII 2010
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have experiences in which they not only experience sexual pleasure, but in which some aspect of the sexual experience transforms the practitioners' capacity for pleasure. If sexual experience, or experience of the decorative arts, or culinary experience succeeds not only in giving pleasure, but in transforming our capacity for pleasure, then it is accorded the status of aesthetic experience. We might fi nd that in all cultures pleasure is taken in all of these things, but that, in some cultures, certain kinds of experience transform the capacity for pleasure, whereas di erent pleasurable experiences are transformative in other cultures. The English and the Japanese drink tea; both take pleasure in it; but only one has elevated it to an art. If tea-drinking is an aesthetic experience for some and a non-aesthetic pleasurable experience for others, it is because an aspect of the tea ceremony transforms some people's capacity for pleasure, whereas other people only take pleasure in drinking tea.
We now have a basis for determining whether Mr. Banks has an aesthetic experience when he fl ies a kite at the end of the movie. If it is merely that he discovers a new source of pleasure, it is not an aesthetic experience. Nor is it aesthetic if it a ords him a cognitive discovery that there is a new way of taking pleasure. It is an aesthetic experience if some aspect of the experience of fl ying a kite transforms how he experiences. Perhaps the capacity for pleasure is transformed by the sense of vicarious fl ight and lightness that is felt by a kite-fl yer who anchors, via a feeble string, an aircraft that soars high above between the air currents, and the experience of fl ying a kite is indeed an aesthetic experience. Perhaps, however, it is just jolly good fun: a pleasurable-but not aestheticexperience. VII F , experience. Aesthetic experience is of ethical value because aesthetic experience is the transformation of the capacity for pleasure, and the transformation of pleasure can be of ethical signifi cance. In making a claim about the ethical status of aesthetic experience, we need not enter into the established debate in analytic aesthetics about the relationship between aesthetic value and ethical value. 53 The kind of growth that occurs in aesthetic experience is of signifi cance for the way we live our lives, although this might not be ethically valuable in the narrow sense in which such value is discussed in philosophy. 54 Aesthetic experience transforms the subject's capacity for pleasure. Such transformations are of signifi cance because they might also be thought to transform the subject by equipping him with new psychological apparatus. There are at least three ways in which aesthetic experience's transformation might provide us with new psychological apparatus. First, aesthetic experience might be thought to transform the subject's existing capacities. For example, some aesthetic experiences might enable creatures that have an evolutionary need for univocal perception to take pleasure in non-univocal perception, although this is contrary to the natural function. Secondly, some aesthetic experiences might be thought to educate us about categories, including ethically relevant categories. Recent work on Aristotle's theory of , for example,
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suggests that this experience might be understood as one in which we clarify our understanding of emotions such as fear and pity. 55 Thirdly, aesthetic experience might be thought to enable us to develop new capacities such as tolerating ambiguity, or the capacity to take pleasure in pain. 56 These are only mentioned as suggestions requiring further detailed consideration.
Philosophers have often preferred to give synchronic accounts of experiences such as perception. 57 In The Thread of Life, however, Wollheim argues that some of the most important experiences, those that are constitutive of who we are, cannot be understood synchronically, but require a diachronic account. 58 Such claims cannot be discussed fully here. Such a diachronic analysis of experience will also be important for understanding why we cannot approach aesthetic experiences discretely if we want to appreciate the transformative e ect that they have on us over time. Thus, a proper account of the experiences discussed in § §3, 4, and 5 would require a diachronic analysis.
Such an analysis of aesthetic experience as the transformation of pleasure is o ered as a contribution to the debate about the nature of aesthetic experience. But it is more than that. It o ers an analysis that allows an explanation of the signifi cance that aesthetic experience has for the way we live our lives. Such a project returns aesthetic experience to ordinary life, and a rms the importance of aesthetic experience for human fl ourishing in the way that Collingwood rea rmed the importance of the practice of art for the practice of life. 59 Notes compose a successful tragedy. But the eighteenth century's concern is with psychological theory. 25 27 If the delightful response is the meta-response, and the object of the meta-response is the direct response, then on this analysis it seems that we are not taking pleasure in the tragedy at all, but in a response to the tragedy. Having sketched out three accounts of tragedy in the literature, it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to assess the critical literature on each. 28 Addison extended the ancient conception of the sublime as self-transcendence found in Longinus: see J. Addison, "Pleasures of the Imagination," The Spectator, No. 114 (1712). Whereas Longinus maintained that self-transcendence was possible through lofty thought and literature, Addison developed this by claiming that such transcendence was possible in the case of nature through visual perception alone. 29 In contrast to Addison, Burke develops a di erent strain of sublime theory found in Dennis's The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry, in which he discusses the enthusiastic terror that is experienced when the spectator enjoys the perception of some terrifying spectacle from a distance that allows him to maintain an awareness of his self-preservation in the face of the perceived threat: E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (London: Routledge, 2008) . 30 Kant's achievement in his study of the sublime in the Critique of Judgement is to combine the two approaches to the sublime found in Addison and Burke: I. Kant above. 31 The two forms of the sublime are the mathematical sublime, in which the size of the object is too great for the subject to estimate (for example, starry heavens and lofty mountains), and the dynamical sublime, in which the magnitude of the natural force is so great that the subject is powerless in the face of it (for example, storms and hurricanes). 32 For an exposition and critical analysis of the weaknesses of Kant's account, see M. Budd in the work cited. 33 34 According to Carroll, the horror genre very often involves a narrative structure that arouses and sustains our curiosity. More than anything else, we are caught up in the process of discovery: a puzzle is posed and then gradually solved, and we take pleasure in this. Questions of proof, explanation, and suspense all play an important role in sustaining our interest. So it is the feeling of participating in solving the mystery that gives us pleasure. Carroll asserts that this mystery invariably involves a monster. The nature of the monster disgusts us. The monster is a creature that challenges our natural categories in one way or another, for example, a werewolf is part man, part beast. Drawing on anthropological theory, Carroll argues that an important part of what disgusts is the very challenge to our natural categories that the monster represents. So we experience a pleasurable response to the form of the narrative structure and an unpleasurable response to the monster that forms part of the content. But Carroll argues for more than this: the curiosity we take in the narrative structure only gets going because of the way in which we are disgusted by the creature that challenges our natural categories. 35 Wollheim (1923 Wollheim ( -2003 was an Anglo-American philosopher who was an acknowledged expert both on the European painting tradition and on psychoanalysis, as well as holding the Grote Chair in Mind and Logic at University College, London, for many years. It is a notable feature of his writing that it merges the connoisseur's eye with the Kleinian's hypotheses of psychoanalysis and the philosopher's commitment to argument. 
